TAXATION: LEGISLATIVE EXPENDITURES NOT
DEDUCTIBLE AS BUSINESS EXPENSES
IN Cammarano v. United States, and F. Strauss & Son, Inc. v. Cornmisssioner,' the Supreme Court held that the taxpayers could not deduct
the expenses incurred in opposing the passage of legislation which would
have destroyed their businesses.2 The taxpayers, through trade organi
zations,8 had helped defeat initiatives submitted to the electorate.4 The
Court rejected the contention that such expenses were ordinary and
necessary business expenses and held that the ambiguous "ordinary and
necessary" test could be implemented by a Treasury Regulation:5

Sums of money expended for lobbying expenses, the promotion or defeat of
legislation, the exploitation of propaganda, including advertising other than
358 U.S. 498 (1959).

The taxpayers claimed that these expenses were "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. z, § 23(a) (i) (A), 53 Stat. I (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)).
.. 'In Cainmarafto v. Unitedi;States, the petitioners had an interest ina partnership
which was a member of the Washington Beer. Wholesalers Association The Association
had established a trust fund for the deposit of funds collected from itsmembers. In
the.Strauss case, the petitioner, with eight other Arkansas liquor wholesalers, organized
Arkansas Legal Control Associates, Inc., which collected contributiois from its members.
I 'Expenditures were made inthe Cammarano case to defeat a measure submitted to
the electorate which, ifpassed, would have placed the sale of beer and wine in the
hands of the state. Inthe Strauss case, the proposed initiative called for statewide prohibition. Influence was exerted ineach case by means of advertising and other forms
of publicity. The petitioners attempted to distinguish expenses incurred in attempting
to promote ot defeat measures before legislatures from expenses incurred to influence
measures submitted directly to the electorate. In rejecting this distinction the court said:
'1We think that initiatives are plainly legislation' within -the neang of these Regulations. Had the measures involved in these cases been passed by the people of Washington and Arkansas they would have had the effect and status of ordinary laws in every
respect.- The Constitutions of the States of Washington and Arkansas both explicitly
recognize that in providing for initiatives they are vesting legislative power in the
people." 358 U.S. at 5o5.
'Treas. Reg. x1, § 39.23 (o)-x (943) ("Contributions or Gifts by Individuals?)
was applied in Cammarano, and Treas. Reg. 11r, § 39.23(q)-i

(1943) ("Contribu-

tions or Gifts by Corporations") was applied in the Strauss case. These regulations
were written pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OP 1939 ch. 2, §§ 23(0) (2) and 23(q) (2),
53 State. x, which, in limiting 4eductibility of charitable contributions, specifically exclude gifts to organizations a substantial part of whose,activities isthe carrying on' of.
propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. The regulations, the' wor'd.
Ing of which isexactly the same, are consolidated inregulations under-the' 95,; C d in
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1S.
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trade advertising, and contributions for campaign expenses, are not deductible
from gross income.
Although this regulation was originally intended to apply only to
the deductibility of charitable contributions, it frequently has been invoked in the context of business expenses.' In the landmark decision
of Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,' the Supreme Court applied this regulation to disallow the deduction of a lobbying expense as
a business expense." Although the Court distinguished legitimate business expenses from legislative expenditures which might contravene
public policy,' it adopted the entire regulation.1" Because of this apparent inconsistency, it is difficult to delineate the precise holding of the
Textile Mills case." Conceivably, some of the expenditures enumerated
in the regulation might qualify as legitimate business expenses.' 2
' See, e.g., Revere Racing Ass'n v. Scanlon, 232 F.2d 816 (ist Cir. 1956); American Hardware & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 2z F.2d x26 ( 4 th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 814 (1953); Harden Mortgage Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.zd 28z
revzd on other grounds, 217
(ioth Cir. 1943) ; Herbert Davis, 26 T.C. 797 (1952),
F.2d 329 ( 9 th Cir. 1954).
314 U.S. 326 (194).

8 In discussing the history of the regulation, the Court said: "The ban against deductions of amounts spent for qobbying' as 'ordinary and necessary' expenses of a corporation derived from a Treasury Decision in x91s." Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v.
Commissioner, supra note 7, at 337. This reference is to T.D. 2137, 17 TREAs. DEC.
INT. REV. 48, 57-58 (1915): "Sums of money expended for lobbying purposes and
contributions for campaign expenses are held not be an ordinary and necessary expense
in the operation and maintenance of the business of a corporation, and are therefore not
deductible from gross income in arriving at the net income upon which the income tax
is computed."
o "Contracts to spread such insidious influences through legislative halls have long

been condemned ....

There is no reason why, in the absence of clear Congressional

action to the contrary, the rule-making authority cannot employ that general policy in
drawing a line between legitimate business expenses and those arising from that family
of contracts to which the law has given no sanction." 314 U.S. at 338-39.
S"Petitioner's argument that the Tegulation is invalid likewise lacks substance.
The words 'ordinary and necessary) are not so clear and unambiguous in their meaning
and application as to leave no room for an interpretative regulation. The numerous
Nor has the
cases which have come to this Court on that issue bear witness to that ....
administrative agency usurped the legislative function by carving out this special group
of expenses and making them nondeductible." Id. at 338.
"' Cases citing Textile Mills, however, often limit interpretation of its holding to the
denial of the deduction because of "lobbying" and do not apply it to the broader concept
of "influence of legislation." See, e.g., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 9o, 95 (1952) ;
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) ; American Hardware & Equip.
Co. v. Commissioner, 2oz F.2d x26 (4 th Cir. 1953); Harden Mortgage Loan Co. v.
Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282 (xoth Cir. 1943).
" All contracts for the influence of legislation have not been condemned. These
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In two subsequent decisions, the Tax Court distinguished between
lobbying and other forms of legislative expenditures. In McClintockTrankey Co. v. Commissioner, 3 the entire deduction was disallowed
because the taxpayer could not determine what portion of the expenditures was not lobbying expenses. 4 In Luther Ely Smith v. Commssioner, 5 which involved a factual situation strikingly similar to that in
the Cammarano case, the Tax Court allowed the deduction of payments
made to an institute to help enact a state constitutional amendment and
noted that no lobbying expenditures were made to the legislature.1 0
The scope of the problem is much greater, however, than a simple
distinction between lobbying expenses and non-lobbying expenses would
indicate.
The regulation invoked in the instant cases may be quite appropriate
when applied to charitable contributions, for, by their very nature, certain institutions engaged in legislative activity have never been appropriate objects of bona fide charitable contributions." But regardless of
the applicability of the regulation to charitable contributions, the tests
for determining deductible business expenses traditionally have turned
on entirely different factors-the purpose of an expenditure and its
relation to the particular business."8 Congress purposely worded the
agreements which seek open and legitimate presentation of facts are legitimate. Steele v.
Drummond, 275 U.S. 199 (1927).
11
T.C. 297 (1952), reld On other grounds, 2 7 F.zd 379 ( 9 th Cir. 1954).
a'The Tax Court denied a deduction for contributions to three organizations including the Beer Association involved in Cammarano. Two of these organizations
clearly fostered legislation, having a direct contact with the legislature. The beer
association, as in the Cammarano case, expressed disapproval of proposed "dry" legislation. Because the taxpayer made the contribution as a single expenditure, being unable to show how much was not for lobbying, the Tax Court found that "a substantial
part of the activities of the organizations .. .was devoted to 'lobbying purposes, the
promotion or defeat of legislation, and the exploitation of propaganda.'" Id. at 304.
253 T.C. 696 (1944),
acq., 1944 CUM. BULL. 26. But acquiescence was withdrawn by Rev. Rul. 58-255, 1958 TNT. REv. BuLL. No. 21, at 16. The withdrawal
coincided with the granting of certiorari in the Cammarano case.
"'The taxpayer, a lawyer, contributed to an organization formed to amend the
Constitution of Missouri by providing that candidates for admission to judicial office be
nominated by a commission. The amendment was adopted, and as a self-operative provision, became law. Here the taxpayer's "business" was not under a threat of imminent
destruction; he had only shown that his trial practice suffered because of a growing
disrespect for the judicial system as it existed. The same regulation involved in Cammarano was found inapplicable, and Textile Mills was not even mentioned.
21For illustrations of nonallowable contributions for partisan or controversial propaganda, see 5 MERTENS, FEDEAz. INCOME TAAT o N § 31.26 (Xi"6).
1' The fundamental requirements of the .deductibility of business expenses, "trade or
business" and "ordinary and necessary," are discussed in 4 MERTENS, op. Cit. supra note
17, §§ 25.08, 25.og0954).
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business expenses section to embrace all forms of expenditures, 9 and it
seems contrary to the manifest purpose of this section to entertain a
blanket prohibition against a certain form of expenditure. Charitable
contributions deductions and business expenses deductons, being fundamentally different in nature and purpose, should be implemented by
separate and distinct regulations.
The inequity of the instant decisions is most obvious when applied
to a business which is peculiarly dependent upon the existence of favorable legislation. Thus, in the Cammarano case, the taxpayers' business
would have been destroyed if the electorate had voted to abolish the
existing methods of liquor distribution. Under the present application
of the regulation, however, the effect upon a taxpayer's business would
be totally immaterial.
The Supreme Court has rejected this argument and has pointed out
that the regulations constitute sharply defined public policy under the
oft-quoted Heininger case. 0 But this rule begs the question because it
would apply with equal force to any Treasury regulation. Rather, the
substantial purpose embodied in a regulation would seem to be the
policy to be applied by the courts. As to business expenses, the essential purpose of the regulation is to prevent the Treasury's underwriting
the political activities of business.2 ' Unfortunately, the language of
this regulation does not limit it to preventing the attainment of political
objectives at the Government's expense. Yet the policy of making expenditures carefully calculated to prevent the economic extermination of
a business entity appears to merit judicial sanction.22 At the least, cases
should be decided on an ad hoc basis in this sensitive policy area.
10

See Alexandria Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.zd 61 5 (5th Cir. 1938).

o Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (9t3).
In Cammarano the petitioners
used this case in support of their argument that sums spent for preservation of business
from destruction are deductible. The Court, however, used the case to open the policy
argument.
21 E.g., "[E]xpenditures incurred for newspaper or magazine advertisements or radio
or television programs urging voters to vote for a particular candidate for political
office will be treated by the Commissioner as nondeductible contributions for political
campaign expenditures." 4 MERTENS, op. cit.
supra note 17, § 25.38. 0954-).
"2When the destruction of a taxpayer's business is imminent the cases uniformly
allow deductiofis on the ground that there is such a direct connection with the life of
the business. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., iS B.T.A. 168 (1929), involving a publicity
campaign to create a favorable public opinion and avert enactment of unfavorable or
injurious legislation for the railroads, represents the leading case in this area. The
Board in allowing the deduction cited as authority, G. T. Wofford, 15 B.T.A. 12z5
(1929), aff'd, 49 F.7d 1027 (sth Cir. 1931)5 George Ringler & Co., io B.T.A. 1134
(19z8); Independent Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 870 (1926).
The Los
Angeles case has been followed in other Tax Court cases involving the same railroad
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Actually, the underwriting of objectionable political activities 2 could

be avoided by application of the Heininger24 and Lilly25 decisions to
business expense deductions. These cases interpreted the inhibiting
effects of public policy considerations upon the deductibility of business
expenses to be properly limited to controversies involving sharply defined policies laid down in statutes and judicial decisions.26 Within these
bounds, it is evident that there are numerous statutes proscribing the
types of political activity which the Treasury would be disinclined to
27
subsidize.
The ramifications of the Cammarano case are far-reaching. If the
decision stands as precedent, corporations will bear the burden of all
payments made to thwart the passage of any form of legislation which
would contravene their business interests. Certain industries, such as
the liquor, cigarette, and trucking businesses, which are peculiarly vulnerable to legislative enactments, will suffer a substantial adverse effect.
Moreover, it seems grossly unfair to penalize a taxpayer for openly and

legitimately protecting itself from potential economic loss or extermination.
Furthermore, if Cammarano and McClintock-Trunkey 28 are folassociation. Texas & Pac. Ry., 9 B.T.A. 365 (1927); Western Maryland Ry., iz
B.T.A. 889 (1928). See also All States Freight, Inc. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ohio 1947) (deduction allowed of expenses incurred where existence of business
threatened in hearings before administrative boards).
28
Of the vatious activities engaged in to influence the passage of legislation, only
certain categories are against public policy. These are the obtaining of legislative
action "as a matter of favor by means of personal influence, solicitation, and the like,
or by other improper or corrupt means." Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. x99, 2o6
(927)-

"'Note 2o
5

supra.

Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (.952).
" Actually the Heininger case, followed in the Lilly case, lays down two standards
for determining deductibility: (i)consideration of the "ways of conduct and the forms
of speech prevailing in the business world," and (z) in order to disallow the expense
there must be frustration of a "sharply defined national or state policy proscribing particular types of conduct." 320 U.S. at 472-473. The distinction is emphasized by two
recent cases: in one, penalties paid by truckers for violations of state law, even though
the violations were unintended, are not deductible as a business expense, Tank Truck
Rentals Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 3o (1957), while in the other, rents and salaries
which would certainly be deductible in lawful enterprise are not disallowed because
incurred in an unlawful business on the theory that "sharply defined national policy"
does not operate to make an illegal enterprise pay taxes on gross receipts in the abence
of.a clear expression of Congressional intent, Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27
(1957.
See also 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 17, § 25.13- (1954)
' T See PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 695 (iX954).
2' See notes 13 & 14"supra..
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lowed, payments made through legitimate trade organizations will fall
under the broad swath of this holding if eventually appropriated for
legislative influence. And if the taxpayer cannot show to the Treasury's
satisfaction what portion of his dues was ultimately appropriated to-this
purpose, then the entire amount will be disallowed.29 Thus, the Treasury has maneuvered itself into an indefensible position through blind
adherence to a regulation not originally intended by the Treasury to
apply to business expenses and worded so broadly as to preclude distinction between taxpayers of individual circumstances.
0

The Tax Court has already applied the Cammarano case in Thomas J. Barkett,

3' T.C. No. 114. (x959).
Assessments paid by a retail liquor store to a trade association were held not deductible. The general purpose of the association was to promote
good standards of conduct among members, but the Tax Court also found some activity
to influence the general public. The taxpayer claimed he joined in order to participate
in the prevention of business practices which had an adverse effect on his business, but
the Tax Court applied Cammarano because he could not show how much of the funds
given to the association was used for carrying on propaganda and influencing legislation.

